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Összefoglaló 
 
A tanulmányban a külső vállalatfinanszírozás elméleti modelljét terjesztjük ki arra az esetre, 
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esetben. Azt is megmutatjuk, hogy a vevő nemfizetési kockázata (gyengén) csökkenti a 
felvehető hitel nagyságát ahhoz viszonyítva, amikor a vevő biztosan fizet. Ugyanakkor 
előfordulhat, hogy a nem fizető vevők arányának növelése növelheti a felvehető hitel 
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Abstract
We extend the theoretical model of external corporate financing to the case when
the buyers of the borrowing firm may default during the financing period. In our
setup there is an asymmetric information and hence moral hazard between the lender
and the borrower concerning the efforts of the borrower. We define the optimal debt
contract in two cases. In the symmetric case the lender and the borrower has the
same information about the buyer, its probability of default. In the asymmetric case
the borrower learns whether the buyer will pay or not before choosing her level of
efforts. We prove that in the asymmetric case the borrowing capacity and the welfare
of the society is weakly smaller than in the symmetric case. We also show that the
nonnegative default risk of a buyer weakly decreases borrowing capacity compared
to the case when the buyer pays for sure. However, it turns out that having a risky
buyer might increase borrowing capacity and welfare.
Keywords: game theory, moral hazard, corporate financing, trade credit JEL classi-
fication G32, C72
1 Introduction
In vertically integrated industries, where suppliers dominantly depend on their buyers,
the default of a buyer may easily result financial contagion in the whole supply chain.
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Several authors emphasize the risk of financial contagion in supply chains. Raddatz (2010)
tested and confirmed the hypothesis whether trade credit chains strengthen comovements
of different sectors as well. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Peria (2007) verifies the well-known
phenomenon that typically Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs) do not pay on
scheduled time. According to the report of Klingen and Castillo (2012), the number of
non-performing loans have increased very rapidly in general after the crisis in Central,
Eastern and Southeast Europe.
We model the loan contracting of a firm which is facing counterparty risk from its
buyers. According to the study of Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Peria (2007), the share of
bank loans compared to the total assets of firms was 17.93 % in developed, and 22.93 %
in developing economies. They remark that both secured and unsecured lending played an
important role. We concentrate on unsecured lending and on the role of information about
the efforts of the borrowing firm and its buyers. Several country studies have analyzed the
financial relationships within supply chains in developed and developing countries recently.
Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2012) note that US firms provided liquidity to
each other during the crisis in 2007-2008. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) em-
phasize that information about the buyers of a firm is potentially valuable. Moreover,
they show that suppliers provide credit for them especially where banks do not reach reli-
able information on buyers because of the lack of transparency. Some other authors have
suggested that this information advantage in the funding of firms may imply a complemen-
tarity between trade credit and bank loans: financing of buyers can even strengthen the
bank lending activity (see Cook (1999) in a Russian study or Garcia-Appendini (2007)).
Carbo´-Valverde, Rodr´ıguez-Ferna´ndez, and Udell (2008) also confirm that trade credits
are given more often in an opaque environment. The above cited papers consistently state
that this kind of credit appears when the supplier has more information on a reliable buyer
than the bank of the buyer. The question is how a bank should finance this supplier.
We choose our approach from the wide family of debt contracting analytical frame-
works introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), Hart and Moore (1998), Tirole (2006)
and others. While the above mentioned studies consider the economic representation of
contracting in general, there are more specific papers related to the role of trade credit
in debt contracts. One can find the original theoretical explanations on the rationale of
trade credit in Schwartz (1974), Myers (1977), Emery (1984) and Biais and Gollier (1997).
Brennan et al (1988) as well as Petersen and Rajan (1994) theoretically derive that trade
credit can be used as a tool for price discrimination, or for guaranteeing higher product
quality. Among others, Devjak and Bogataj (2007) investigate the mathematical modelling
of cash and liquidity issues by firms. Our main theoretical base is the seminal article of
Holmstrom and Tirole (2000) who analyze firm liquidity issues in debt contracts.
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This paper revises the borrower-lender relationship in case of trade credit. We provide
a model of corporate financing where the lender has to consider the counterparty risk
originated from the buyers of the borrower as well. In our setup there is an asymmetric
information and hence moral hazard between the lender and the borrower concerning the
efforts of the borrower. We define the optimal debt contract in two cases. According to the
symmetric case neither the lender nor the borrower knows whether the buyer will pay or
not in advance. In the asymmetric case the borrower learns the action of the buyer before
the moral hazard, contracting is under additional asymmetric information. We show that
in the asymmetric case the borrowing capacity and the welfare of the society is weakly
smaller than in the symmetric case. We also prove that the nonnegative default risk of a
buyer weakly decreases borrowing capacity compared to the case when the buyer pays for
sure. However, it turns out that having a risky buyer might increase borrowing capacity
and welfare.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept of
bank-borrower-buyer interdependencies and our model in two different information setups.
This section also presents and derives the optimal debt contracts. In Section 3 we prove
and illustrate our results. The last section concludes.
2 The model
When modeling the bank loan constraints of a firm with a buyer who might default, we
concentrate on the moral hazard aspects (what the firm will do with the loan) and assume
away other considerations like risk averse lenders or lenders with market power. As we will
see even in this setting we observe credit rationing.
The general setup of our model using the notation of Tirole (2006) is the following. A
risk neutral entrepreneurial firm, where the owner manages the firm with limited liability,
wishes to start an investment project of size I ∈ [0,∞) resulting in a risky payoff in
some future point of time. When I is invested in case of success the project yields payoff
RI (constant returns to scale), where R > 1. In case of failure, the whole investment
is lost. Assuming that the expected net present value of the project is positive, due to
the constant returns to scale investment technology the firm would like to invest as much
as possible. However, the initial cash asset of the firm is A, thus the firm is ready to
borrow I − A under reasonable conditions. We assume that lenders are also risk neutral,
there is perfect competition among them and without loss of generality the expected rate
of return is normalized to zero. Under those conditions the firm would like to borrow as
much as possible, but moral hazard makes it difficult. The success of the project depends
on how much effort the borrower invests into it. We assume two discrete levels of efforts.
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With higher efforts of the borrower the probability of success is pH , with lower efforts it
is pL, where 0 ≤ pL < pH ≤ 1. To denote the difference in those probabilities we will
use ∆p = pH − pL. We will also refer to higher efforts as behaving and to lower efforts as
shirking. In case of shirking the borrower receives a private benefit proportional to the size
of the project BI, where B > 0. The shirking gain BI can be considered as the utility of
the efforts saved by shirking, or it can also be seen as using the assets of the firm in a way
that only brings private benefits to her but creates no value for the lender.
The novelty in our model is that the borrower and the lender agree on the amount of
the loan I − A taking into account an exogenous third party, the buyer of the borrower.
In case the buyer defaults, then part cRI is lost from the payoff of an otherwise successful
project, where the ratio of potential loss due to the buyer c ∈ [0, 1] . In case of failure, due
to the limited liability of the borrower the payoff of the project remains zero. The buyer
of the borrower pays with probability q ∈ [0, 1] and defaults with probability 1 − q. The
loss cI can be interpreted as a defaulted trade credit or as the economic loss due to late
payment. Moreover, if the buyer is not paying, then the probability of success (pH or pL)
is multiplied by δ ∈ [0, 1] . The factor δ can be interpreted as a common macroeconomic
factor or simply as the complication caused by the non-paying buyer.
The timeline of the project is illustrated in Figure 1. In theory we have four cases,
both the borrower and the lender can learn the action of the buyer before or after the
moral hazard. We investigate two alternatives. According to the symmetric case neither
the lender nor the borrower has any information about the action of the buyer until its
payment date. Thus both the lender and the borrower negatively modify their expectations
about the payoff of the project due to the possible losses. One can identify this situation as
the typical problem of buyer delivery risk, which may cause contagion of bankruptcies. In
the asymmetric case the borrower learns the action of her buyer before the moral hazard,
contracting is under additional asymmetric information. In this case as the borrower
learns the solvency of the buyer much earlier than the lender, she can use this information
to change her level of efforts. In an economy, where contagion of defaults is general, and
banks cannot obtain the counterparty risk of borrowers related to their buyers, lenders also
build this issue into their expectations. We exclude the other two alternatives on timing
issues. When both the lender and the borrower know in advance the default of buyer,
then there is not much to model. Finally, it is not common in practice that a lender gets
informed before the borrower about the action of her buyer. Thus we will compare the
symmetric case to the asymmetric one, where the borrower has information advantage on
her buyer and can use it to decide whether to behave or shirk.
In both cases the expected net present value of the project is calculated as follows.
E [NPV] = p [q + (1− q) δ (1− c)]RI − I = pαRI − I, (1)
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Figure 1: Timing.
where p is the probability of success in general (it can be either pH or pL) and α =
q + (1− q) δ (1− c) can be interpreted as the expected discount to the payoff of the project
RI due to the default risk of the buyer.
Remember that both the borrower and the lender are risk neutral, hence their decisions
are based upon expected value. We assume that the expected net present value of the
project is positive only if the borrower behaves. It is negative even considering the expected
private benefit of shirking, which is
[q + (1− q) (1− c)]BI = γBI, (2)
where γ = q + (1− q) (1− c) is the expected reduction in the value of the private benefit
of the project BI due to the default risk of the buyer. We call the above assumption the
moral hazard assumption and formalize it using Equations (2) and (1) as follows.
Assumption 2.1. (Moral hazard)
E [NPVbehaving] = pHαRI − I > 0
E [NPVshirking] = pLαRI + γBI − I < 0,
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Due to Assumption 2.1 the lender should force the borrower to behave. The loan
agreement is defined as follows. In case of success the borrower gets Rb independently of
the action of her buyer and the remaining payoff goes to the lender. In case of failure
nobody gets anything from the payoff of the project, only shirking can give payoff to the
borrower.
Finally, we assume that all the parameters of the model are common knowledge between
the borrower and the lender.
2.1 The symmetric case
In this case neither the lender nor the borrower has any information about the action of
the buyer until its payment date. Figure 2 gives an overview of the game in extensive form.
The lender moves first, she decides about the credit application before it is known whether
the buyer of the borrower pays or not. The borrower moves next, and chooses about the
extent of effort to be exerted. In the third step we treat the exogenous action of the buyer
(payment or default) as a move by nature. The last move is by nature again, representing
whether the project is successful or not. The elements of the payoff vectors are in the
following order. First we get payoff of the project, then the payoff of the borrower, finally
the payoff of the lender.
The optimal contract is determined by the individual rationality constraint of the lender
and by the incentive compatibility constraint of the borrower as follows. As we note before
in case of success the borrower gets Rb independently of the action of her buyer and the
remaining payoff goes to the lender. Due to Assumption 2.1 the lender will force the
borrower to behave. If the borrower behaves, then looking at Figure 2 one finds that the
expected payoff of the lender is
pH ([q + (1− q) (1− c) δ]RI − [q + (1− q) δ]Rb) . (3)
Since we have assumed that the lender lending I − A is risk neutral, she lends on a
competitive market and the expected return is zero, the individual rationality constraint
of the lender is
pH ([q + (1− q) (1− c) δ]RI − [q + (1− q) δ]Rb) = I − A. (4)
Using α = q + (1 − q)δ(1 − c) defined in Equation (1) we find that the individual
rationality constraint of the lender is
pH (αRI − βRb) = I − A, (5)
where for later conveniences β = q + (1− q) δ denotes the expected reduction in the payoff
of the borrower Rb due to the default risk of the buyer.
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Figure 2: The extensive form of the symmetric game. The payoff vectors are showing the
payoff of [the project; the borrower; the lender].
The incentive compatibility constraint of the borrower ensures that her expected payoff
attainable through increased efforts is more attractive to her than shirking, even if she
considers the private benefits of shirking, that is
pH [q + (1− q) δ)]Rb ≥ pL [q + (1− q) δ)]Rb + [q + (1− q) (1− c)]BI. (6)
Using ∆p = pH − pL, β defined in Equation (5) and γ defined in Equation (2) the
incentive compatibility constraint of the borrower reads as
Rb ≥ BI
∆p
γ
β
. (7)
To induce the borrower to behave, this is the minimal payoff that should be offered to her
in the debt contract.
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Take any required investment level I > A. The question is how much initial cash asset
the borrower should have to get the required loan I − A.
Proposition 2.2. (Existence of debt contract in the symmetric case)
Take any required investment level I > A in the model of Section 2. In case of symmetric
information about the buyer between the lender and the borrower, the lender will give loan
I − A to the borrower if
A ≥
[
1− pH
(
αR− γ B
∆p
)]
I = As, (8)
where As denotes the lowest initial cash asset required for contracting loan I − A.
Proof. After combining Equation (5) with Inequality (7) and expressing A we get
Inequality (8). 2
If the lowest initial cash asset required As is less than zero, then any investment level
can be supported by zero cash, meaning that the equilibrium investment level is infinite.
To exclude this case, we assume that the parameters are such that As > 0.
Let us use the notation of
ks =
1
1− pH
(
αR− γ B
∆p
) . (9)
Inequality (8) can be expressed as
ksA ≥ I. (10)
The borrower can invest ks times her cash A, that is why ks is called the equity multiplier
in the symmetric case. Note that using the inequalities in Assumption 2.1 it follows that
αR > γ
B
∆p
, (11)
which implies that ks > 1, thus there will be a positive amount of loan given to the borrower
in the symmetric case. Next, let us discuss the asymmetric case.
2.2 The asymmetric case
Figure 3 shows the extensive form of the game in the asymmetric case. First the lender
moves and decides about debt contracting. Then nature reveals the exogenous action of
the buyer of the borrower. Hence the borrower learns whether her buyer will or will not pay
before deciding about behaving or shirking. The last move is by nature again, representing
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Figure 3: The extensive form of the game with informational advantage of the borrower.
The payoff vectors are showing the payoff of [the project; the borrower; the lender].
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whether the project is successful or not. The elements of the payoff vectors are in the same
order as in the symmetric case. First we get payoff of the project, then the payoff of the
borrower, finally the payoff of the lender.
Again, the optimal contract is determined by the individual rationality constraint of
the lender and by the incentive compatibility constraint of the borrower. Since the lender
is risk neutral and also in this case she will induce the borrower to behave, the lender takes
the expected value of her payoffs and compares it to the loan I − A. Thus similarly as in
Equation (5) the individual rationality constraint of the lender is
pH (αRI − βRb) = I − A (12)
The incentive compatibility constraint of the borrower ensures that it is worth for her
to behave. However, the borrower knows the action of the buyer when deciding about the
level of her efforts. Hence the lender should make sure to induce the borrower to behave
independently of the action of her buyer. If the buyer pays, then the incentive compatibility
constraint of the borrower is
pHRb ≥ pLRb +BI. (13)
Using ∆p = pH − pL Equation (13) can be rearranged as
Rb ≥ BI
∆p
. (14)
If the buyer is not paying, then the incentive compatible constraints of the borrower becomes
δpHRb ≥ δpLRb + (1− c)BI, (15)
which can be rearranged as
δ
1− cRb ≥
BI
∆p
. (16)
If δ > 1 − c, then Equation (14) is binding. If δ < 1 − c, then it is Equation (16) which
should be considered. We will call δ > 1 − c as Case 1 and δ ≤ 1 − c as Case 2. The
economic interpretations of the two cases are as follows. Case 1 captures industries with
low macroeconomic sensitivity and a relatively higher rate of trade credit for supporting
buyers. Here the discount factor in success in case of a non-paying buyer δ is close to one.
Case 2 reflects on firms with high macroeconomic sensitivity or firms with a low level of
future claims for their buyers. The related equity multipliers are calculated as follows.
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Proposition 2.3. (Existence of debt contract in the asymmetric case)
Take any required investment level I > A in the model of Section 2. In the case of asym-
metric information about the buyer between the lender and the borrower, the lender will
give loan I − A to the borrower if
A ≥ 1
ka
I = Aa, (17)
where Aa is the lowest asset level for contracting and the equity multiplier ka is given by
ka =

1
1−pH(αR−β B∆p)
if δ > 1− c,
1
1−pH(αR−β 1−cδ B∆p)
if δ ≤ 1− c.
(18)
Proof.
Case 1 (δ > 1− c):
The individual rationality constraint of the lender, Equation (12) should be combined
with Inequality (14) to get
A ≥ I
{
1− pH
[
αR− β B
∆p
]}
.
Case 2 (δ ≤ 1− c):
Equation (12) and Inequality (16) leads to
A ≥ I
{
1− pH
[
αR− β 1− c
δ
B
∆p
]}
.
2
Again, we make sure that the equilibrium investment level is finite by assuming that
the parameters are such that Aa > 0. Note that Assumption 2.1 does not guarantee that
ka > 1. In fact we will see in Figure 4 that it can happen that ka < 1. In that case there
will be no loan given since Equation (17) is not satisfied.
3 Results
In this section we analyze the differences between the borrowing capacity in the symmetric
and in the asymmetric case and also compare it to the case when the buyer has no default
risk. In those cases we also look at the optimal ratio of potential loss due to the buyer c.
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3.1 Equity multipliers
We have introduced the notion of equity multiplier in order to measure borrowing capacity.
For a general equity multiplier k, we have that if k > 1, then the borrower can invest k
times her cash asset A, implying that she should borrow (k−1)A. In terms of conventional
financial metrics, k corresponds to the leverage ratio calculated as total assets over equity.
The higher the value of k, the larger the attainable project size I and the larger the expected
net present value (NPV) of the project in Equation (1). The welfare of the project can be
measured by the expected NPV. Since there is perfect competition among the lenders, the
whole expected NPV goes to the borrower. Thus both the society and the borrower would
like to have as high equity multiplier as possible.
To see how the information advantage of the borrower over her buyer is changing
borrowing capacity, we have to compare the equity multiplier of the symmetric information
case ks in Equation (9) to the equity multipliers of the asymmetric case ka in Equation (18).
Proposition 3.1. (The information advantage of the borrower on her buyer weakly reduces
borrowing capacity)
The equity multiplier in the symmetric case is at least as large as the equity multiplier in
the asymmetric case, ks ≥ ka.
Proof.
Case 1 (δ > 1− c):
In this case ka < ks is equivalent to 1− 1ka < 1− 1ks . Using Equations (18) and (9) we
have to show that
pH
(
αR− β B
∆p
)
< pH
(
αR− γ B
∆p
)
,
which has a positive right hand side using Equation (11) and simplifies to
β > γ. (19)
Using β = q + (1− q)δ and γ = q + (1− q)(1− c) in Equation (19) we get that δ > 1− c,
which was our initial assumption.
Case 2 (δ ≤ 1− c):
To get that ka ≤ ks an equivalent inequality is 1− 1ka ≤ 1− 1ks . Thus using Equations (18)
and (9) we have to show that
pH
(
αR− β 1− c
δ
B
∆p
)
≤ pH
(
αR− γ B
∆p
)
,
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which again has a positive right hand side using Equation (11) and can be rearranged as
β
1− c
δ
≥ γ.
Expressing β and γ we get that
q (1− c) + (1− q) δ (1− c) ≥ δq + δ (1− q) (1− c) ,
which simplifies to our initial assumption 1− c ≥ δ. 2
Thus the information advantage of the borrower on her buyer weakly reduces borrowing
capacity and hence it also weakly reduces the welfare of both the society and the borrower.
It can be considered as an informational paradox, since the information advantage of the
borrower hurts herself. However, the solution of the paradox lies in the increased moral
hazard. Note that since the symmetric case requires the lowest initial cash for the same
investment level I, to make sure that the equilibrium investment is finite, it is enough to
assume that the parameters are such that As > 0.
When the ratio of potential loss due to the buyer c is zero and the discount in success
in case of a non-paying buyer δ is one, then there is no default risk of the buyer. Let us
denote the equity multiplier in this case by k0 and compare it to the equity multipliers in
case the buyer has a nonnegative default risk.
Proposition 3.2. (The default risk of a buyer weakly decreases borrowing capacity)
If the buyer has no default risk, that is c = 0 and δ = 1, then the equity multiplier is at
least as large as if the buyer has default risk, k0 ≥ ks and k0 ≥ ka.
Proof. By Proposition 3.1 if the buyer has default risk, then the largest possible
multiplier is in the symmetric case and by Equation (9) it is given as
ks =
1
1− pH
(
αR− γ B
∆p
) .
We have to compare it to the case when the buyer has no default risk. Using c = 0 and
δ = 1 in α = q + (1− q) δ (1− c) and γ = q + (1− q)(1− c) we get that α = 1 and γ = 1,
thus the equity multiplier if the buyer has no default risk is given as
k0 =
1
1− pH
(
R− B
∆p
) . (20)
If c ≥ 0, then we have that α ≤ γ ≤ 1, which using Equation (11) implies that
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ks =
1
1− pH
(
αR− γ B
∆p
) ≤ 1
1− pH
(
γR− γ B
∆p
) ≤
≤ 1
1− pH
(
R− B
∆p
) = k0.
2
Thus we have proven that the default risk of a buyer weakly decreases borrowing ca-
pacity, and hence it also weakly decreases the welfare of both the society and the borrower.
It seems that if it can be chosen by the borrower, then the optimal ratio of potential loss
due to the buyer c should be zero. However, as the next subsection shows, it is not always
the case.
3.2 The optimal ratio of potential loss due to the buyer c
Let us assume that a borrower can choose the ratio of potential loss due to the buyer
c to maximize her welfare. Since the welfare of the borrower and the size of the equity
multiplier move together, the borrower would like to maximize the equity multiplier. Let
us analyze how it can be done both in the symmetric and in the asymmetric case. We
assume that the buyer is not paying for sure (q < 1), otherwise modifying c would have no
effect.
Before doing that, note that Assumption 2.1 constraints the possible values of c as
follows. To have a positive NPV when behaving, c must not be too high, that is
c < 1− 1− qpHR
(1− q) pHRδ = c (21)
should be satisfied. To have a negative NPV when shirking, c must not be too low, that is
c > 1− 1− q (pLR +B)
(1− q) (δpLR +B) = c (22)
should hold. Thus c ∈ [c, c] ∩ [0, 1] = [cmin, cmax], where using Equations (21) and (22) we
get that
cmin =
0 if q ≤ 1−
1−(pLRδ+B)
(1−δ)pLR ,
c if q > 1− 1−(pLRδ+B)
(1−δ)pLR
(23)
and
cmax =
c if q ≤ 1pHR ,1 if q > 1
pHR
.
(24)
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Proposition 3.3. (The optimal ratio of potential loss due to the buyer c)
Assume that the buyer is not paying for sure, q < 1. Let δ∗ = B
∆p
1
R
. In the symmetric case
the equity multiplier ks reaches its maximum
a) at c = cmin (when the buyer has no default risk) if δ > δ
∗;
b) at c = cmax if δ < δ
∗; and
c) it is constant and maximal everywhere if δ = δ∗.
Let
q∗ =
δR− B
∆p
δR− B
∆p
(
1− 1
δ
) . (25)
In the asymmetric case the equity multiplier ka reaches its maximum
a) at c = cmin if q < q
∗;
b) at c = cmin if q ≥ q∗ and cmin ≥ 1− δ;
c) at c = cmax if q > q
∗ and cmax < 1− δ;
d) at c = 1− δ if q > q∗ and cmin < 1− δ < cmax; and
e) it is constant and maximal everywhere in c ∈ [0,min{cmax, 1− δ}] if q = q∗ and
cmin < 1− δ.
Proof.
In the symmetric case the equity multiplier ks given by Equation (9) has the partial
derivative
∂ks
∂c
= −
pH (1− q)
[
δR− B
∆p
]
(
1− pH
(
αR− γ B
∆p
))2 . (26)
If δ > B
∆p
1
R
= δ∗, then since pH > 0 and q < 1 we have that ∂ks∂c < 0, thus the maximum
of ks is at c = cmin.
If δ < δ∗, then since pH > 0 and q < 1 we have that ∂ks∂c > 0, thus the maximum of ks is at
c = cmax.
If δ = δ∗, then ∂ks
∂c
= 0.
Next, let us analyze the asymmetric case. If δ > 1− c, that is c > 1− δ, then ka given
by Equation (18) is a monotone decreasing function of c, since by assumption pH > 0,
q < 1 and
∂ka
∂c
= −δ (1− q) pHRk2a < 0. (27)
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Thus the maximum of ka for c ∈ [1− δ, 1] is at c = 1− δ.
If δ ≤ 1− c that is c ≤ 1− δ, then ka can move in any direction in c, since by assumption
pH > 0, q < 1 and
∂ka
∂c
= −pH
(
δ (1− q)R− 1
δ
β
B
∆p
)
k2a. (28)
Looking at the expression after pH in brackets in Equation (28) let us define the thresh-
old q∗ as
q∗ =
δR− B
∆p
δR− B
∆p
(
1− 1
δ
) . (29)
If q < q∗, then for c ≤ 1− δ we have that ∂ka
∂c
< 0, thus the maximum of ka is at c = cmin
in part a).
For c ≤ 1 − δ if q > q∗, then we have that ∂ka
∂c
> 0, if q = q∗, then we have that ∂ka
∂c
= 0
. Depending on the relationships among cmin, cmax and 1 − δ parts b), c), d) and e) are
explained. 2
Figure 4: The equity multipliers as a function of the ratio of potential loss due to the
buyer (c) in case the buyer has no default risk (k0), in the symmetric case (ks) and in the
asymmetric case (ka).
Panels a), b), c) and d) of Figure 4 illustrate Propositions 3.2, 3.1 and 3.3. Depending
on the relationship between δ and δ∗ and q and q∗ we might have four cases, but as it can
be easily verified δ < δ∗ and q < q∗ cannot happen at the same time, thus panel d) contains
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pH pL R B δ q δ
∗ q∗ cmin cmax
a) 0.7 0.3 2.15 0.4 0.7 0.65 0.4651 0.2612 0 0.9410
b) 0.7 0.3 2.15 0.4 0.3 0.65 0.4651 -0.1192 0 0.8624
c) 0.7 0.3 2.15 0.4 0.9 0.35 0.4651 0.4569 0.0048 0.4625
d) 0.7 0.3 2.15 0.4 1.0 0.80 0.4651 0.5348 0.2153 1
Table 1: The parameters used in Figure 4.
an other interesting case with δ = 1. Just like Proposition 3.2 claims in general, the equity
multiplier if the buyer has no default risk (k0) is the largest on all panels, and since it does
not depend on c, it is constant. In accordance with Proposition 3.1, the second largest
equity multiplier is in the symmetric case (ks) and by Proposition 3.1 the equity multiplier
in the asymmetric case (ka) is at most as large as in the symmetric case (ks) on all panels.
Note that ka < 1 for a while on panel b). In that case there will be no loan given since
Equation (17) is not satisfied.
Proposition 3.3 allows both ks and ka to be maximal at c = cmin, this can be seen on
panels c) and d). However, on panel b) both ks and the first part of ka are increasing, they
are maximal somewhere in the middle (ks at c = cmax = 0.86245 and ka at c = 1−δ = 0.7).
This means that in those cases the borrower has to have a risky buyer to boost borrowing
capacity and her welfare. The intuitive explanation is the following. Increasing c has two
effects. On the one hand using α = q + (1 − q)δ(1 − c) defined in Equation (1) it is
increasing the expected discount to the payoff of the project RI due to the default risk
of the buyer, which decreases the welfare of the borrower. On the other hand looking at
γ = q+(1− q) (1− c) defined in Equation (2) it is increasing the expected reduction in the
value of the private benefit of the project BI due to the default risk of the buyer, leading
to a lower moral hazard in lending. On panel a) the latter effect dominates only in the
asymmetric case up to c = 1 − δ = 0.3. Note that on panels a), b) and c) the maximal
possible value of c is less than one and on panels c) and d) the minimal value of c is larger
than zero.
4 Conclusion
We have presented a model of corporate financing where the borrower may have informa-
tional advantage about the default of her risky buyers. On top of whether the borrower
behaves or shirks, the risky buyers generate additional asymmetric information between
the borrower and the lender. We have shown how the lender modifies the offered credit
terms depending on if the borrower knows (asymmetric case) or does not know (symmetric
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case) whether her buyers will pay in the future before she can substantially modify her
efforts. It turned out that the higher the borrowing capacity the higher the welfare of both
the society and the borrower.
The asymmetric case is typical in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, where the
borrower and her buyers are socially interconnected. In this case there is a high chance
that the borrower becomes aware of the financial difficulties of her buyers. To avoid the
shirking actions of the borrower, the lender must offer a special debt contract. We have
found that the borrower accesses only a weakly lower level of external financing if she had
an information advantage on her buyers. This unwanted practice cannot be eliminated by
only providing more liquidity for firms.
As it was expected, we have shown that the nonnegative default risk of a buyer weakly
decreases borrowing capacity compared to the case when the buyer pays for sure. We have
also calculated how the borrower should set the ratio of potential loss due to the buyer.
The optimal value of claims on risky buyers can be zero or a positive number both in the
asymmetric and in the symmetric case. Thus the welfare of the borrower may be increased
by lending to a risky buyer. In this case the higher trade credit is not increasing sales in
the model, but reduces the private benefit of shirking more than the expected payoff of the
project.
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